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ATIORNEYS' FEES AGAINST GOVERNMENT 

DEFENDANTS ECONOMICS REQUIRES 

A NEW PROPOSAL 

Mary C. Dunlap* 
A few years ago, as Snoopy lay smiling on the roof of hIS dog­
house, Charlie Brown stood nearby and declared: "When a person 
takes on an mstitutIon, the mstitutIon has a definite tendency to 
wm. Current law on the awarding of attorneys fees agamst gov­
ernment defendants! should be exammed and understood m the 
context of Charlie Brown s pithy observatIon. ThIS IS necessary be­
cause federal and state governments are a shapmg force m all 
litIgatIon. From court systems to the law itself, governmentally 
financed JudicIal, legIslative, and admmistratIve VOIces are omnI­
present. 
ThIS ubIquitous presence gIves government the upper hand m 
cIvil litIgatIon, especIally if procedure controls substance. Govern­
ment, not prIvate mdividuals or entitIes, deCIdes who may sue 
whom and who may sue the government. 2 It IS government whICh 
deSIgnates the form and scope of its own liability 3 It IS govern­
ment whICh determmes the rules of litIgatIon. 4 These rules differ 
entIate between government and non-government defendants with 
respect to serVIce of process,5 due dates for responSIve pleading, 6 
*Visiting ASSOCiate Professor, Umversity of Texas at Austin School of Law, 1979. 
B.A., 1968, J.D., 1971, Umversity of Califorma at Berkeley Cofounder and staff 
attorney-teacher, Equal Rights Advocates, Inc. 1974-78. 
1. The emphaSIS of thIS article IS upon federal CIvil law pertaInIng to attorneys 
fees awards. 
2. It IS disputable whether the legIslature or JudiCIal branch has the greater 
power In determInIng nghts of action. See Cannon v. Umversity of ChIcago, 99 S. Ct. 
1946 (1979), Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Overall, these two branches of govern­
ment together deCIde when and whether government IS subject to suit. 
3. Illustrative of thIS power are the exceptions to the Federal Tort ClaIms Act, 
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976). See LaIrd Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (Federal Tort 
ClaIms Act exempts government from action for property damage allegedly covered 
by military plane somc boom); Dalehite United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953) (Fed­
eral Tort Claims Act did not render the federal government responsible for an explo­
sIOn of its ammomum nitrate fertilizer). 
4. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure constitute the governmental rule of lit­
Igation. 
5. FED. R. CIV P 4(d)(4). 
6. [d. 12(a). 
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and availability of default Judgment; 7 and where the differences are 
not explicit, they are customary 8 
Yet, government IS not a homogeneous structure with a smgu­
lar purpose, scope, or form. Governmental entitIes mclude federal, 
state, and mUnIcIpal governmg bodies, each havmg numerous sub­
divISIOns. PhilosophICal differences as to attorneys fees have been 
manifested by a contmumg IdeologICal four way tug of war between 
the Supreme Court, the lower courts, Congress, and the states. 
The latest demonstratIon of thIS tug of war IS exemplified m the 
United States Supreme Court's declSlon m Hutto v. Finney 9 In 
Hutto the Court held that Congress may deCIde when attorneys 
fees are to be awarded agamst state and local governments. The 
court found that the eleventh amendment10 did not bar the award 
of attorneys fees to a prevailing party agamst a state offiCIal to the 
extent that such an award was grounded upon the Civil Rights At­
torney s Fees Awards Act of 1976. 11 The actIon was agaInst state of­
fiCIals based on cruel and unusual pUnIshment for theIr failure to 
cure conditIons m a pnson. 12 
While Hutto may mdicate a state-federal constitutIOnal strug­
gle, the ImplementatIon of the attorneys fees concept ongmally 
caused a tug of war between the Supreme Court on one sIde and 
Congress and lower federal courts on the other Until the Supreme 
Court's 1975 declSlon m Alyeska Pipeline Sermce Co v Wilderness 
Soctety 13 JudicIal discretIon had been exercIsed frequently by 
lower courts m the awarding of attorneys fees agamst both public 
and pnvate defendants. Awards were gIVen to prevailing partIes 
7. Id. 55(e). 
8. In the author expenence, lateness and delay on the part of government liti­
gants are more often abided by Judges than lateness and delay on the part of non­
governmental litigants, espeCially In matters such as responsive pleadings, motions 
to Intervene and bnefs. 
9. 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (Burger, C.J., RehnqUlst, White, & Powell, JJ, dis­
senting). 
10. "The JudiCial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit In law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). 
12. The action In Hutto was brought pursuant to § 1983 for failure of state 
pnson offiCials to cure conditions amounting to cruel and unusual pumshment. See 
437 U.S. at 681, 693. The Attorney General of Arkansas unsuccessfully argued that 
the awarding of attorneys fees against state offiCials was not authonzed by the Civil 
Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 and was prohibited by the eleventh 
amendment,Id. at 693. 
13. 421 U.S. 240 (1975). 
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who litIgated cases "in the public mterest" as private attorneys 
general. "14 Alyeska limited the discretIOnary authority of the lower 
courts to award these fees. IS In direct response to the Supreme 
Court's positIon, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees 
Awards Act. 16 While still m its mfancy the Act's primary message 
14. See Newman Piggle Park EnterprIses, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (awarding fees 
under the public accommodations section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act displays 
congressIOnal policy In favor of prIvate litigation as the major means of securIng stat­
utory compliance); Lea Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (1971) (applied Newman ra­
tionale to title VII cases despite the fact that the attorney was hired as an 
orgallizational attorney who did not look to the plaIntiff for the feel; Lee Southern 
Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971) (further policy of encouragIng prIvate 
litigation to enforce statute by permitting recovery of attorney fees when black 
plailltiff IS deprIved of civil rIghts when barred from the sale of land); La Raza Umda 
v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (successful action resulted In effectuation of 
strong public policy of environmental protection for many, the Illdivlduals brlllgIng 
suit would be awarded fees from the state treasury). 
15. 421 U.S. at 269. 
[Because] the approach taken by Congress to thiS Issue [of attorneys fees] 
has been to carve out specific exceptions to general rule that federal courts 
cannot award attorneys fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1923, those 
courts are not free to fashIOn drastic new rules with respect to the allowance 
of attorneys fees to the prevailing party III federal litigation or to pICk and 
choose among plaIntiffs and the statutes under whICh they sue and to award 
fees In some cases but not III others, depending upon the courts assessment 
of the Importance of the public poliCies Involved III particular cases. 
[d. 
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). ThiS act provides In part: 

[I]n any action or proceeding to enforce prOVISIOn of Sections 1981, 1982, 

1983, 1985, and 1987 of thiS title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or III any 

civil action or proceeding, by or on behalf of the United States of AmerIca, 

to enforce, or chargIng VIOlation of the United States Internal Revenue 

Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, In its discretion, 

may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, reasonable at­

torney fee as part of the costs. 

[d. 
The substantive areas covered above Illclude suits InvolvIng: racial discrImllla­
tion In contracts and employment under § 1981. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 
(1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Johnson 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Scott v. Umversity of Del., 601 
F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1979); Alexander Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass of Machlllists 
and Aerospace Workers, 565 F.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), houslllg and property transac­
tions under § 1982: Jones Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Dillon AFBIC Dev 
Corp., 597 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244 
(5th Cir. 1979); ReSident AdVISOry Bd. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977); Meyers 
Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977), suits by 
sub-federal governments under §§ 1983, 1985 (1), (2) & 1966: Hall v. Pennsylvama 
State Police, 570 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1978); Wiley v. MemphiS Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 
1247 (6th Cir. 1977); Kimbrough O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975); Vasquez 
City of Reno, 461 F Supp. 1098 (D. Nev 1978), by prIvate conspirators under § 1985 
(3): see Griffin Breckenndge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); McLellan MiSSISSIPPI Power & 
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appears to be that a sIgnificant part of the pnvate attorney gen­
eral" basIs for fee awards, overturned by Alyeska, has been recon­
structed. Alyeska allows fees to be awarded under the common 
fund, substantIal benefit, and "bad faith theones, "17 the Act 
Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977); McNally Pulitzer PublishIng Co., 532 
F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1976); Cohen v. IllinOis Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 
1975); Croy SkInner, 410 F Supp. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Reichardt Payne, 396 F 
Supp. 1010 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Hohensee v. Dailey, 383 F Supp. 6 (M.D. Pa. 1974), 
federally aSSisted programs under § 2000d; Hills Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); 
Lau Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Coates IllinOiS State Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 
445 (7th Cir. 1977); Joy Damels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Shannon HUD, 
436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970); BOSSier Pansh School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th 
Cir. 1967); Otero Mesa County Valley School Dist., 470 F Supp. 326 (D. Colo. 
1979); School Dist. of SagInaw HEW 431 F Supp. 147 (E.D. Mich. 1977), sex dis­
crimInation suits agaInst sub-federal governments under § 1983: see Monell De­
partment of Social ServICes, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Marshall Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 
(8th Cir. 1979); Simcropi Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1979); Allen 
LovejOY 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977); Braden v. Umversity of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 
948 (3d Cir. 1977); Vorchelmer School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), by con­
spIrators to depnve persons of Civil nghts on account of sex under §§ 1983 & 
1985(3): Life Ins. Co. of North Amenca Reichart, 591 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1979); 
Cohen IllinOIS Inst. of Technology, 581 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1979); Girard v. 94th St. 
& Fifth Ave. Corp. 530 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1976); Cohen IllinOIS Inst. of Technology 
524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975); Weise v. Syracuse Umv 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); 
Vasquez City of Reno, 461 F Supp. 1098 (D. Nev 1978); Hams v. Pennsylvama, 
419 F Supp. 10 (M.D. Pa. 1976), federally aSSisted educational programs under 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1976): see Cannon Umversity of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979); 
Jumor College Dist. v. Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979); Islesboro School 
Comm. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979); Umversity of Toledo HEW 464 
F Supp. 693 (N.D. OhIO 1979); PIascik Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F Supp. 
779 (N.D. OhIO 1976); Cape Tennessee Second School Athletic Ass n, 424 F 
Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), suits based upon sub-federal or conspIratonal VIOla­
tions of constitutional or Civil nghts, under §§ 1983 & 1985: see Murphy Mount 
Carmel High School, 543 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1976); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 
231 (6th Cir. 1968); Moran Bench, 353 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1965); Sixth Camden 
Corp. Township of Eversham, 420 F Supp. 709 (D. N.J. 1976); Hams Ward, 
418 F Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Croy Skmner, 410 F Supp. 117 (N.D. Colo. 
1976); cf Great Am. Fed. Sav & Loan Ass v. Novotny, 99 S. Ct. 2345 (1979) (the 
court held that vIOlation of title VII could not be asserted through § 1985(c) ac­
tion); and, tax cases where non-United States defendants prevail under the Internal 
Revenue Code: But cf, Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 436 F Supp. 891 
(D. Or. 1977) (Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976 does not authonze at­
torneys fees agamst federal defendant but does agamst state defendant); Aparacor, 
Inc. v United States, 571 F.2d 552 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (Civil Rights Attorney Fees 
Awards Act of 1976 does not authonze attorney fees for taxpayer mitiated refund 
suit). 
17 421 U.S. 257-59. The Supreme Court defined each of the theOries upon 
whICh attorneys fees could be awarded, absent an authorIzmg statute. Under the 
common fund theory the equitable powers of the courts allow for an attorney to re­
ceive proportionate share of plamtiffs recovered or preserved common fund. Id. at 
257 The attorneys fees IS to be paid out of the fund. [d. The equity power of the 
court IS also applied under the common benefit theory where the losmg party whICh 
315 1979] NEW APPROACH 
provIdes a broader foundatIOn for attorneys fees awards agamst 
certam government defendants m specific cases. 18 
Alyeska also left open the award of attorneys fees based on ex 
plicit statutory authonzatIOn. 19 The present body of federal statu­
tory law on attorneys fees, however resembles an unfimshed 
patchwork quilt.20 Statutes permittmg awards of attorneys fees ap­
pear serendipitously 21 While it IS safer and eaSIer to prevail on the 
question of attorneys fees by usmg a statute rather than by relymg 
upon the "bad faith, common fund, or substantial benefit 
theones,"22 it IS not always easy to find the statutes. Once the 
statute IS found, however the battle IS not won. Plamtiffs must 
prevail pnor to any fee award. Prevailing agamst the government 
was compelled to pay attorneys fees was the benefiCIary of the litigation. See Mills 
Electnc Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (corporate defendant In stockholders 
denvative suit had to pay the attorneys fees of the plaIntiff shareholders under the 
theory that the corporation benefited from the litigation). The court may also award 
attorneys fees agaInst a party whICh proceeds In bad faith, or for vexatious, wanton 
or oppressIve reasons. 421 U.S. at 259. 
For an exhaustive diSCUSSIOn of these theones and the cases applYIng them see 
Salisbury Equitable Bases for Attorneys Fees, 1 COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION 157-78 (H. Newburg, Chrmn. 1978). 
18. The applicability of § 1988 to cases where federal offiCIals, agencIes or enti­
ties are defendants IS the subject of current, unresolved litigation. Compare Shannon 
v. HUD,433 F Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 577 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1979) (the court of appeals held that the Civil Rights Attor­
neys Fees Awards Act of 1976 did not permit an award of counsel fees agaInst the 
United States In suit brought under title VII of the Act because there was no clear 
statutory authority to permit the award) with NAACP Bell, 448 F Supp. 1164 (D. 
D.C. 1978) (suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 agaInst the Justice Department 
challengIng non-dual prosecution policy In whICh the plaIntiff was awarded attor­
neys fees even after the department changed its policy makIng the case moot). 
19. 421 U.S. at 270-71. 
20. ThIS patchwork has prompted one commentator to observe: "[M]embers of 
Congress frequently offer attorney fee amendments, without much fanfare, to bills as 
they move through the legIslative process. Thus one must look very carefully, espe­
CIally through volumInOUS legIslation, to find counsel fee provlSlon that may be 
applicable to vour case. Wolf, Federal LegIslative Outlook For New Opportunities 
For Fee Awards, 2 COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION 
412-13 (H. Newburg, Chnnn. 1978). 
21. Among the federal statutes affording attorneys fees awards In CIvil nghts 
litigation that have not been mentioned are: The Freedom of Infonnation and Pn­
vacy Acts, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), (g)(2)(B), (3)(B)(1976); The FaIr Labor Standards 
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976) encompaSSIng the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Id. § 206(d) 
and the Age DiscnmInation In Employment Act, Id. § 621, The VotIng Rights Act 
ExtenSIOn of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731. (e) (1976); The Emergency School AId Act of 
1972,20 U.S.C. § 1617 (1976); The Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 
2000e-5(k) (1976). See Cohen, Award of Attorneys Fees Against the United States: 
The SovereIgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W NEW ENG. L. REV 177 (1979). 
22. See note 17 supra. 
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entails distmct economIC23 as well as legal consIderations. 
ThIs author knows of no case m whICh government, great or 
small, old or new has been compelled to go mto court without 
counselor to forego litIgatIon because of madequate economIC re­
sources. Government has the maSSIve, expandable litIgatIOn re­
sources whIch allow it to appear m court whenever necessary To 
the pnvate litIgant, government IS an economICally formIdable, if 
not mvmcible, opponent. Furthermore, III cases where government 
IS a defendant, the disparity of economIC resources IS remforced by 
the fact that the government attorneys are compensated, wm, lose, 
or draw 
In companson, the pnvate litIgants attorney often works on 
the contmgency of a negotIated or court-ordered fee award. ThIs 
arrangement IS often necessitated by the client's mability to afford 
counsel. Therefore, non-governmental attorneys are confronted 
with the ImpractIcability of years of protracted litIgatIon and 
escalated costs, usually with no mtenm compensatIOn. 24 Thus, the 
awarding of attorneys fees theoretIcally enabling attorneys to ac­
cept essentIal constitutional and cIvil nghts claIms, may be an 
illusory politIcal promIse when such a system IS predicated upon a 
substantIal mitIal capital expenditure. 
To prevail IS an absolute prereqmsite to receIpt of the fee 
23. Nongovernment funds for public Interest" law are shnnkIng. COUNCIL 
FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAw BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUB­
LIC INTEREST LAw IN AMERICA (1976). 
In the prototypical realm of title VII, employment discnmInation for example, 
one recent foundation report describes the economic phenomenon: 
Title VII cases are becomIng ever more difficult to litigate because of the 
cost of discovery and the need for expensive experts the discovery proc­
ess affords determIned opponent numerous opportunities to escalate the 
cost of the proceedings even more. PrOVided defendants are willing to spend 
money to combat Title VII claims and there IS every Indication of an In­
creased willingness on their part to do so, they can launch an all out paper 
war, expanding the scope of discovery through their own demands for Infor­
mation, while resisting plaIntiffs requests. PlaIntiffs are forced to further ex­
penditures of time and money if they want to move the action along. While 
the enormous cost of discovery IS not umque to Title VII actions-the 
pervasiveness of the problem has prompted cnes for refonn-the harm IS 
particularly acute when, as In Title VII actions, there IS an enormous dis­
parity between the financial resources of the parties. 
M. BERGER, LITIGATION ON BEHALF OF WOMAN: AN ASSESSMENT 54-56 (1979) (foot­
notes omitted) (emphaSIS added). 
24. But see Bradley Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974); Chan­
dler v. Roudebush, 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~75S9, at 4904 (C.D. Cal. 1977). An Intenm 
award, however, IS of no use where the prevailing party must prOVide one hundred 
percent collateral for bond III order to receive the fee. See Smith v. Umon Oil Co., 
IS Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. l1S3 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
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award m cIvil cases. ThIs prereqUIsite may seem stunmngly logICal 
on its surface, m that the declared purpose of these statutes IS to 
encourage the representatIOn of persons havmg meritOriOUS claIms. 
The prevailing party standard, however should be reexammed 
more closely m light of other broader purposes of litigation agamst 
government. 25 It should also be reexammed In light of the reality 
that government defendants are free to make ligitatIon prohib­
itively expenSIve regardless of the merits. 
ConSIderation should be gIVen to a new approach to the 
awarding of attorneys fees. As a congreSSIOnally controlled experi­
ment, legIslation should be enacted that would reqUIre payment of 
attorneys fees awards agamst government defendants m all cases 
presently covered by the attorneys fee statutes, whether or not the 
plamtiff prevails. ObVIOusly the courts would prohibit awards m all 
actions whICh were "frivolous, unreasonable or without founda­
tIon"26 or whIch were conducted m "bad faith. "27 ThIS proposition 
would not modify the current criteria used by the courts to pro­
hibit the award of attorneys fees. 
The chIef hypotheSIS of the proposed experiment IS that most 
plamtiffs, excluding multmatIonal corporations, challengmg the 
government are m a position of economIC disadvantage. Thus, 
there IS a strategIc premIUm for government defendants to protract 
litigation, escalate costs and conduct wasteful paper wars m order 
to overwhelm the plamtiffs. If thIS method of legal advocacy by war 
of attritIOn IS used m meritOriOUS cases, it will undermme the es­
sential princIple of statutes such as the Civil Rights Attorney s Fees 
Awards Act of 1976. 
25. Consideration should be given, for example, to public mformation and edu­
cation, government accountability, political orgamzmg and first amendment exercises 
by oppressed groups. 
26. See Chnstianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (district 
court may award attorney fees to preVailing title VII defendant upon finding that 
the plaintiff' case was fnvolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though 
suit was not brought with subjective bad faith). 
27. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) (prevailing respondent awarded at­
torneys fees under § 102 of Labor Management Reporting Disclosure Act, m suit to 
regam membership m umon after dismissal for alleged deliberate and malicIOUS vili­
fication of umon management). The Court stated that while the presence of bad faith 
IS essential to fee shifting, bad faith alone IS not dispositive under national policy 
accepting the common benefit doctnne. 412 U.S. at 15. Flashmann Distilling Corp. 
Maler Brewmg Co., 386 U.S. 714, 719 (1967) (Lanham Act does not allow for re­
covery of attorneys fees even when there was deliberate mfnngement of trade­
mark nghts, however, fees are appropnate m certam ClTcumstances such as Civil con­
tempt action based upon wilful disobedience); Vaugh v. Atkmson, 369 U.S. 527 
(1962) (plaintiff received maintenance award and attorneys fees m lieu of damages 
when respondents callous attitude resulted m Ineffective medical treatment). 
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A second hypothesIs also can be posited. If there IS an award 
of attorneys fees whether or not the plamtiff wms, government de­
fendants will be discouraged from wastmg public tax mOnIes and 
governmental resources whIch result from protracted litIgatIOn. 
Thus, adoption of the proposal will encourage expedient resolutIOn 
based chIefly on the merits, and not on relative economIC endur­
ance. 
Like any radical legIslatIve experiment, the proposed program 
carnes certam rISks. There IS the possibility that legal profeSSIOnal 
opportunIsm will be encouraged, resultmg III a proliferation of 
poorly handled, publicly financed lawsuits under the experimental 
law There IS also the mterrelated possibility that courts will reSIst 
the awarding of fees by expanding the prohibitory "frivolous, un­
reasonable," without foundatIon," and "bad faith standards. If 
thIs expanSIOn occurs, it will prevent awards to many deservmg 
plamtiffs. 
The extent of expenditure of public momes to pay such fee 
awards, and the likelihood of abusIve actions on the part of some 
attorneys, are exceedingly difficult to predict. Nevertheless, to the 
extent that present attorneys fees awards statutes sIgnify major 
congressIOnal determmatIOns about public mterest" priorities, 28 
the proposed experiment would be gUIded by a recognitIOn that it 
would be unlikely to worsen the present gap between theory and 
practice, whICh IS presently perpetuated by litIgation resource 
disparities between government and others. 
The proposal merits consIderatIon and ImplementatIOn because 
the distance IS too great between the prinCIple that certaIn litiga­
tion deserves public financIng and the reality that some of that liti­
gation agamst government defendants IS plaInly economIcally mfea­
sible. Too often, public Interest law concerns are displaced because 
of the politIcal and economIC primacy of the government as a law­
maker law enforcer, law mterpreter and CIvil defendant. The pro­
posal, to authOrize awards to plaIntiffs for litigatIOn of partIcular 
types of cases whether or not they prevail, IS aImed at reducmg the 
mequity of litIgation resources that presently dimIllishes the practI­
cal, real-life worth and effectIveness of public Interest attorneys 
fees awards law 
28. The proposed legislative expenment assumes lack of comprehenSiveness 
of current federal statutory attorneys fees awards proVISIOns encompassmg substan­
tive public mterest" law pnorities. There are Significant pnorities, such as con­
sumer and enviTonmental protection Issues that are not currently addressed by the 
patchwork quilt of statutes. 
